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ABSTRACT:  Portuguese and Spanish universities have adopted well-defined royalty 
sharing schedules during the last fifteen years. We investigate whether these inventor 
royalty shares have been effective at stimulating inventors’ efforts and ultimately 
improving university outcomes. We base our empirical analysis on university-level data 
as well as on new self-collected surveys completed by inventors and Technology 
Transfer Offices (TTOs). Econometric evidence from the university-level dataset 
indicates that royalty shares have no impact on patenting or licensing income. The same 
result emerges from the inventors’ survey, with most respondents claiming to be largely 
unaffected by royalty sharing. Evidence from both the TTO and inventors’ surveys 
suggests that inventors do not react to royalty sharing because of the poor commercial 
prospects of their inventions, which means there is little income to be shared. These 
poor prospects appear to reflect the fact that the TTOs do not focus sufficiently on 
commercializing inventions and inventors are unable to produce potentially licensable 
inventions.   
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1. Introduction 
It is well documented that the so-called third mission of universities, consisting of 
transferring knowledge to industry, has real effects on local economic development 
(Etzkowitz, 2002; Jaffe, 1989). Such knowledge transfer can be implemented via a 
number of routes including the hiring of students, sponsored research, licensing, the 
creation of university spin-off firms or simply via knowledge spillovers (Bercovitz and 
Feldman, 2006). In this regard, one mechanism that has become increasingly important 
for researchers and policymakers is patent licensing (Geuna and Rossi, 2011; Perkmann 
et al., 2013).
5
 
 
A question that has aroused considerable interest of late is whether pecuniary incentives 
to inventors are a useful tool for improving licensing outcomes. In the US, as in most 
European countries, university intellectual property policies grant the university control 
rights over inventions (Sampat et al., 2003; Geuna and Rossi, 2011). The royalty 
income from inventions is then shared between the inventor and the university 
according to terms generally specified by the university. This naturally allows (or even 
forces) universities to decide which pecuniary incentives, in the form of inventor royalty 
shares, are to be offered to inventors. If inventors care about potential royalties, then 
universities can conveniently set inventor royalty shares so as to incentivize their effort. 
Studies to date, however, present mixed results as to whether such royalty sharing 
arrangements are effective at incentivizing academics’ efforts (Sauermann et al., 2010, 
Perkmann et al., 2013), suggesting that they might be persuasive in certain institutional 
contexts but not in others (Sauermann et al., 2010). 
 
The purpose of our paper is to investigate the role of inventor royalty shares in 
incentivizing patenting and licensing in universities in Portugal and Spain, two 
countries with specific characteristics that make them an interesting case. First, 
university patenting and licensing are recent and remain at a low rate. Second, 
Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) are relatively young and still in an early stage of 
                                                            
5 Patenting and licensing are important components of university technology transfer and have been the 
focus of many studies in the last two decades. Verspagen (2006) has surveyed the literature on university 
patenting, while Baldini (2006) has provided a review of the literature on patenting and licensing in 
universities.   
 
2
  
their learning curve.
6
 Third, the quality of applied research might not be as high as that 
in the US.
7
 Fourth, both countries have been particularly active over the last few years 
in developing appropriate infrastructure for improving knowledge transfer (Geuna and 
Rossi, 2011; Lissoni, 2013; Cartaxo and Godinho, 2014). Among the many measures 
taken has been the adoption of well-defined royalty sharing schedules by universities. 
Here, we seek to determine whether inventor royalty shares have successfully 
incentivized inventors’ efforts in universities in Portugal and Spain, and, if not, what it 
is that prevents royalty shares from being effective.   
 
We build on the framework proposed by Lach and Schankerman (2008) to analyse the 
conditions under which inventor royalty shares are likely to be effective. Intuitively, 
inventors will only care about royalty sharing if the revenues to be shared can be 
expected to be non-trivial. In this regard, there are three factors that moderate the 
inventor’s expected license revenue: the inventor royalty shares themselves, the 
effectiveness of the university TTO at commercializing patented inventions (the so- 
called gatekeeper effect) and the inventor’s ability to undertake applied research. Higher 
inventor royalty shares will serve as a greater incentive if the right interplay exists 
between the three moderators (i.e., inventor royalty shares are sufficiently high, TTOs 
are good at commercializing inventions and inventors are good at generating licensable 
inventions). In contrast, inventor royalty shares will not matter if the licensing game is 
blocked by a poor interplay between the three moderators (i.e., inventor royalty rates are 
too low, TTOs are ineffective at commercializing inventions or inventors produce 
inventions with little commercial value).  
 
Within this framework, we seek to answer two research questions. First, is the interplay 
between the moderators in Portugal and Spain such that inventor royalty shares are 
effective at stimulating inventors’ efforts and improving university outcomes? Second, 
if not, what prevents inventor royalty shares from being effective? Or more specifically: 
Are inventor royalty shares poorly chosen by universities? Are TTOs ineffective at 
commercializing inventions?  Are inventors bad at generating licensable inventions?  
 
                                                            
6 See Macho-Stadler et al. (2007) for a theoretical model of the role of TTOs in licensing university 
inventions. 
7 Both because universities recruit researchers with basic, rather than applied, research profiles and 
because recruitment practices are not always oriented at recruiting the best available candidates. 
3
  
In order to empirically answer these research questions we employ a mix of objective 
evidence from university-level data and subjective evidence from new self-collected 
surveys addressed to TTOs and inventors. We exploit the content in the different 
datasets by combining descriptive statistics and econometric analyses.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical setting and derives 
the research questions of interest. Section 3 offers a review of the institutional context in 
Portugal and Spain and describes the datasets used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 
empirically answers the research questions posed in Section 2. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Analytical setting and research questions 
In the traditional “Mertonian” world of scientific discovery, the main goal of the 
majority of scientists is to establish their priority of discovery by being the first to 
communicate an advance in knowledge (Stephan, 1996; Lam, 2011). Accordingly, most 
scientists seem to be motivated by the traditional reputational and career rewards 
provided by the scientific community that come in the form of eponymy, prizes and 
publication (Stephan, 1996; Lam, 2011). In line with this traditional view of what 
motivates scientists, some studies conclude that reputation lies at the heart of scientists’ 
decision to patent.
8
   
 
While it is widely argued in the literature that academics respond to non-pecuniary 
incentives, recent research has sought to determine whether academics also care about 
monetary incentives. This growing interest in understanding the role of monetary 
incentives is closely related to recent measures aimed at improving university 
technology transfer. Pecuniary incentives are regarded as a potentially effective means 
involving scientists, not just in discovery, but also in the transfer of the generated 
knowledge beyond the boundaries of academia (Markman, 2004).  
 
Lach and Schankerman (2008) develop a simple model that captures the dual incentives 
of scientific research with scientists caring about both reputation (publications) and 
royalty income. They derive the sufficient conditions under which the inventor’s royalty 
share stimulates the inventor’s effort. As Geuna and Rossi (2011) point out, universities 
                                                            
8 See Bodas Freitas and Nuvolari (2012), Göktepe-Hulten and Mahagaonkar (2010), Baldini et al. (2007) 
and Owen-Smith and Powell (2003). 
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have an increasing amount of autonomy that allows them to devise bylaws affecting 
research activity and the management of knowledge transfer. Therefore, whether a 
measure works or not might depend on university-specific environmental parameters. 
Lach and Schankerman (2008) pay particular attention to one such university-specific 
environmental parameter: the effectiveness of the TTO at commercializing inventions 
(the so called ‘gatekeeper’ effect). We “augment” their model to account for another 
environmental aspect: the ability of inventors to do applied research.
9
 This dimension is 
likely to modulate the incentive effect of royalty shares in Portugal and Spain, where the 
ability of academic inventors to carry out applied research might be insufficient to 
produce licensable inventions.   
 
Basic setup – Scientists derive utility from both scientific publications and license 
revenue. Scientific publications can be obtained through three types of effort: basic 
research, applied research devoted to starting new projects and applied research aimed 
at improving the quality of each project. License revenue (denoted by r ) can be 
obtained through applied research devoted to starting new projects (denoted by n ) and 
applied research devoted to improving the quality of these projects (to ensure that new 
projects are suitable for commercialization by the TTO). Notice that the distinction 
between basic and applied research (together with the fact that basic research only 
affects publications but not license revenue) imposes a possible tradeoff between the 
two through the allocation of effort. 
 
Importantly, a scientist’s license revenue not only depends on her individual effort, but 
also on the pecuniary incentives offered by the university (the so-called inventor royalty 
share ]1,0[s ), the TTO’s effectiveness at commercializing inventions (the so-called 
gatekeeper effect ]1,0[ ) and the scientist’s ability to conduct applied research (which 
we denote by ]1,0[ ). This last dimension is not explicitly taken into account in Lach 
and Schankerman (2008) who assume scientists to have a sufficiently high level of 
ability ( 1 ) to generate inventions that will be licensed by the TTO with some 
                                                            
9 We use “ability to do applied research” to refer to the capacity to undertake applied research that can 
subsequently be exploited economically by patenting and licensing. We could also have used the terms 
“ability to do relevant or commercially oriented applied research”. We admit that scientists can conduct 
quality applied research that simply may not be suitable for economic exploitation through patenting and 
licensing. 
5
  
probability. Here, we seek to consider an additional scenario in which less able 
scientists ( 0 ) produce inventions with no probability of being licensed by the TTO. 
The ability parameter   can be accommodated within Lach and Schankerman’s (2008) 
setting as an interaction with the gatekeeper parameter  . This implies that the 
expected commercial value associated with a given level of research effort can be 
attenuated either because the TTO is not good at commercializing ideas or because the 
inventor is less capable of conducting applied research.  
 
Lach and Schankerman (2008) show that optimal basic and applied research efforts 
(both devoted to starting new projects and to improving the quality of each project) are 
increasing in the inventor royalty share s , in the TTO effectiveness   and in the 
scientists’ ability to conduct applied research  .
10
 This in turn implies that both license 
revenue and the number of new research projects per faculty are also increasing in s , 
  and  : ),,( sr  and ),,( sn .
11
  
  
Moderators – Parameters s ,   and   act as moderators of the scientist’s research 
efforts. Sufficiently low values of any of these parameters would cause license revenue 
to drop from the utility function, thereby reducing a scientist’s incentives to undertake 
applied research (though not completely given that she might still want to conduct 
applied research in order to increase utility through publications). For instance, if the 
inventor royalty share is very low ( 0s ), the scientist’s license revenue will be zero, 
regardless of the quantity or quality of the inventions, and the license revenue motive 
drops from the utility function. Similarly, if the TTO is not good at all at 
commercializing inventions ( 0 ), the scientist’s expected license revenue will be 
zero and all the scientist will care about is her publication record. Finally, scientists will 
not care about license revenue if their ability to conduct applied research is such that not 
even the maximum applied research effort can raise the quality of their inventions above 
the minimum standards required for commercialization by the TTO ( 0 ). Scientists 
                                                            
10 These results only hold if the diminishing returns to income in the utility function are not “too strong” 
and if there is complementarity between basic and applied research efforts. The results still hold for 
applied research (but not for basic research) even if there is no interaction between applied and basic 
research.  
11 Lach and Schankerman (2008) only provide results for s  and  . As mentioned above, a convenient 
way of accommodating parameter   within their setting is by interacting it with   (i.e., before 
whenever we had  , we now have  ). This implies that comparative statics results for   naturally 
extend to  . 
6
  
will therefore only play the licensing game if s ,   and   all take reasonably large 
values and interact to create the appropriate incentives.  
 
Interaction effects – We are interested in assessing how inventors react to one of the 
three moderators of an inventor’s efforts: namely, royalty shares ( s ). Clearly, however, 
for these royalty shares to be effective, they need to take meaningfully large values. A 
second condition to ensure that the inventor royalty shares matter is that   and   must 
both be at least greater than zero. If they are not, the expected royalties shared out to 
scientists will always be zero, regardless of the inventor royalty share established. 
 
Research questions – If the right interplay between the “moderators” s ,   and    
exists, the theoretical predictions in Lach and Schankerman (2008) should prevail and 
royalty shares should be effective. It is this effectiveness that we seek to test 
empirically. Our first research question, therefore, is stated as follows:  
 
Research question 1. Are inventor royalty shares in Portugal and Spain 
effective at stimulating inventors’ efforts and improving university 
outcomes? 
 
All the empirical studies conducted to date, that we are aware, of that have set 
themselves the objective of answering this question are summarized in Table 1. The 
literature provides mixed results that reflect the substantial heterogeneity in the 
methodologies adopted, datasets employed and geographical contexts analyzed (a 
finding in line with the literature review by Perkmann et al., 2013). The variety in the 
results would also seem to suggest that the conditions under which royalty shares are 
effective might not hold everywhere. Understanding which contextual factors make 
royalty shares an effective pecuniary incentive has been the goal of a small number of 
papers. Lach and Schankerman (2008) find the royalty shares of private universities to 
be more effective (arguably as they are more pro-active than public universities at 
commercializing inventions). Similarly, Belenzon and Schankerman (2009) find royalty 
shares to be substantially more effective in universities with TTOs under incentive pay 
systems. Both results can be taken as evidence that the gatekeeper effect matters. Walter 
et al. (2013) find that the extent to which financial incentives are effective at stimulating 
7
  
the inventor’s propensity to disclose inventions depends on inventor characteristics such 
as academic field or patenting experience. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
In addition to knowing whether inventor royalty shares are effective, we seek to 
determine whether any of the “moderators” of a scientist’s efforts block the licensing 
game. First, we need to know if the inventor royalty shares are large enough for the 
licensing game to make sense. If they are, we next need to determine whether the other 
two “moderators” prevent the royalty shares from being effective. Our second research 
question can be formalized as follows: 
 
Research question 2. When inventor royalty shares are not effective, 
what prevents them from performing the role they were expected to play? 
More specifically: are inventor royalty shares poorly chosen by 
universities? Are TTOs ineffective at commercializing inventions? Are 
inventors bad at generating licensable inventions?  
 
3. Institutional setting and data 
3.1. Institutional setting 
The Bayh–Dole Act of 1980 allowed US universities to retain intellectual property 
rights on patents resulting from government funded research and to license these patents 
on an exclusive or non-exclusive basis (Sampat et al., 2003). Most European countries 
have converged towards the US model and abolished the professor’s privilege and the 
adoption of institutional ownership (Geuna and Rossi, 2011; Lissoni, 2013). This is the 
case of Portugal and Spain where universities retain the ownership of inventions. 
Below, we describe the institutional environment in Portugal and Spain in some detail. 
 
Institutional ownership – The Portuguese intellectual property law (Código da 
Propriedade Industrial) is devoid of any specific reference to university intellectual 
property. Universities have traditionally been the sole proprietors of the inventions 
generated by faculty with statutory legislation not foreseeing the participation of faculty 
in licensing revenues. The first explicit university-specific intellectual property rights 
8
  
policy with well delimited inventor royalty shares was not adopted until 1998 in the 
Instituto Superior Técnico. Similar statues were gradually adopted over the following 
decade, with the vast majority of universities today operating well-defined royalty 
sharing schemes.
12
 
 
Spain was one of the first European countries, together with the United Kingdom and 
Switzerland, to adopt the institutional ownership system (Azagra-Caro, 2011; Geuna 
and Rossi, 2011). The framework for scientific and patenting activities has been well 
defined since the 1980s when the University Reform Law allowed university 
researchers to receive income from contracts with firms, including arrangements that led 
to patents and licensing (Azagra-Caro, 2011).
13
  
 
TTOs – Both in Portugal and Spain the different phases of university patenting, ranging 
from the disclosure of inventions to licensing, are managed by technology transfer 
offices (TTOs).  
 
In Portugal, two different types of TTO coexist: GAPIs and OTICs. The former are 
technology licensing offices and can be found in universities, technology centres and 
business associations. The latter are technology transfer offices and are only operative 
in academic institutions (see Cartaxo and Godinho, 2011). GAPIs and OTICs are 
relatively young (most of them being created around or after 2000) and small, usually 
employing no more than two or three technicians.
14
  
 
In Spain, TTOs go by the name of OTRIs (Offices for the Transfer of Research Results) 
and all public universities have one. OTRIs are responsible for the transfer of university 
research through a variety of forms including spin-off creation, R&D projects, patenting 
and licensing. The first OTRIs were created in 1988 via a public policy initiative aimed 
                                                            
12 The University of Coimbra adopted explicit intellectual property right norms in 2003 and several other 
universities did so between 2005 and 2011.  
13 In particular, the Spanish Law of Patents (Law 11/1986 of Patents of Inventions and Utility Models) 
gives both universities and researchers incentives to patent the results of their research. 
14 GAPIs were created by the Portuguese Patent and Trademark Office (INPI) as of 2000 with the aim of 
promoting the use of intellectual property. OTICs were established as of 2006 by the Innovation Agency 
(AdI). Some GAPIs and OTICs were based in previously existing extension offices. In such instances, 
technology licensing and transfer activities coexist with other tasks (such as mentorship to spin-offs, 
training or research management). These GAPIs and OTICs tend to employ a larger number of staff, but 
the figure of no more than two or three technicians engaged in technology transfer remains valid for most 
universities.  
9
  
at promoting co-operation between university and industry.
15
 OTRIs acquired an official 
character in 1996 and organized themselves in a network (known as RedOTRI) in 1997. 
The number of OTRIs grew substantially after these two events. 
 
Royalty sharing schedules – Almost all universities in Portugal and Spain have their 
own regulations on the split of licensing income. The schedules are freely chosen by 
each university and have to be approved by their respective management bodies. 
Income is generally allocated either to universities or researchers, but on occasions can 
also be shared with the inventor’s department or research group. The royalty shares in 
force in each university are reported in the corresponding intellectual property rights 
rules of the university. Changes in their values have to be duly notified through changes 
in the intellectual property right statutes. As we explain in more detail below, inventor 
royalty shares tend to concentrate around 50% and most universities specified their 
royalty sharing schedules after 2000.  
 
Patenting and licensing trends – University patenting is a recent, albeit increasing, 
phenomenon in both countries. In Portugal patenting was not an issue until the late 
1990s. The first university patent was not awarded until 1998, and it was not until 2001 
that the cumulative number of university patents reached double figures. This late take-
up in university patenting can partially be accounted for by the failure of the intellectual 
property law to explicitly define norms with regard to university patenting. Despite the 
late start, the share of university patents in Portugal (over the total number of patents in 
the country) rose from almost zero in 2000 to more than one third in 2009. There is little 
to say about licensing, as data on licensing income is not available for Portuguese 
universities. Yet, this lack of availability suggests that licensing is not a prominent 
activity within Portuguese universities. 
 
University patenting in Spain was not frequent until the 1990s. Since this date the 
number of university-owned patents has experienced continuous growth with the 
number of university patent applications (in the national patent office) rising from 210 
in 2000 to 496 in 2012. At present, patents awarded to universities account for almost 
                                                            
15 The 1986 Law for the Promotion and General Coordination of Scientific and Technological Research 
(the “Science Law”), which emphasized the need to promote collaboration in R&D between firms and 
universities, established the foundations for the creation of the first OTRIs. 
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15% of all patent grants (almost twice the share in 2000). Although the distribution of 
patents is strongly skewed, with some universities being particularly active, patenting is 
not restricted to a specific group of universities and almost all public universities 
consistently apply for at least one patent per year. Total licensing income (from patented 
and non-patented technologies) has experienced a similar trend rising from €0.5 million 
in 2000 to €2.5 million in 2011. Licensing income from patents seems to account for 
slightly more than one half of total licensing income (with some variations over time). 
On average, each Spanish university generated €60,000 of license income per year 
during the period 2007-2011.
16
  
 
3.2. Data 
In order to study the impact of inventor royalty shares on university technology transfer 
outcomes we use three self-constructed datasets for each country: a university-level 
dataset, a survey addressed to all Portuguese and Spanish university TTOs and another 
survey to a representative sample of inventors in Portugal and Spain. Each dataset is 
described below.  
 
University-level dataset – This is an unbalanced panel spanning the years 2007 to 2011 
(both inclusive) for 15 Portuguese and 39 Spanish universities.
17
 The sampling criterion 
was to retain all university-years (for the period 2007 to 2011) for which all the 
following variables could be observed: inventor royalty shares, the number of patent 
applications made at the respective national offices, licensing income (only for Spain), 
size and age of the TTOs, faculty size and the volume of R&D expenditure (only for 
Spain).
18
 Clearly, the inventor royalty share had to be accurately defined for the 
university to be included in the sample. Most of the instances in which we had to 
discard a university-year were because information on outcomes (patents or licensing) 
                                                            
16 Data on licensing income can be found in the Red-OTRI Surveys for the years 2005 to 2011. Notice 
that the numbers reported for Spain are extremely low compared to the income generated in the US. 
According to Lach and Schankerman (2008), US universities generated on average $3.6 (€3) million of 
license income per year during the 1990s with the top 10% private universities earning over $11.5 (€10) 
million per year (almost five times more than all the Spanish universities together). 
17 We restrict the panel to the period post-2007 as inventor royalty share schedules had not been defined 
in several Portuguese universities before this date.  
18 The dataset for Portugal contains information on 15 universities and accounts for 97% of university 
patent applications in the period 2005-2012. Spain had 47 universities reporting information on patent 
applications and 44 universities reporting information on licensing in the 2010 Red-OTRI Survey. Here, 
the university-level dataset includes information on 39 universities. This accounts for 83% of the 
universities reporting patents and 89% of the universities reporting licenses. 
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or the explanatory variable of interest (inventor royalty share) was not available. Table 2 
provides descriptive statistics for each of these variables. Table 3 provides definitions 
and sources for the different variables. 
 
[INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3] 
 
The main outcomes of interest (licensing income and number of patent applications) 
take rather low values and their distribution is highly skewed across universities. 
Licensing income in Spain (note no data are available for Portugal) ranges from a 
minimum of zero to a maximum of €600,000. Average licensing income is slightly 
above €60,000 per year, but the median is much lower at €29,600. The average number 
of annual patent applications is around 10 for both Portugal and Spain. This number is 
also unevenly distributed across universities with the minimum and maximum values 
ranging from 0 to 54 in Portugal and 0 to 72 in Spain. The median number of patent 
applications is slightly below the mean (7.5 in Portugal and 9 in Spain).  
 
Inventor royalty shares in Portugal and Spain present similar patterns. Figure 1 plots the 
distribution of royalty shares with average and median values standing at around 55% in 
both countries. Most universities opt to fix the inventor royalty share at between 50 and 
60% with only a few universities opting for extremely low (around 30%) or high (above 
70%) royalty shares for inventors.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
 
TTO survey – The main objective of the survey addressed to the TTOs was to obtain 
the exact inventor royalty share at each university, the year in which royalty shares were 
first introduced and whether the shares have experienced significant changes over time. 
We were also interested in understanding the administrative process by which the 
royalty sharing schedules were approved at each university and the goals each 
university pursued with its specified royalty share.  
 
The survey was sent to all Portuguese and Spanish TTOs during 2011. The response 
rate was highly satisfactory. All Portuguese TTOs (i.e., 22 TTOs) filled in the survey 
12
  
between June 2011 and April 2012 and 47 Spanish TTOs did so between January 2011 
and December 2012 (an 89% response rate).
19
 
 
As it transpired most of the universities surveyed first defined their royalty sharing 
schedules after 2000 (95% in Portugal and 73% in Spain). Once fixed, most royalty 
shares have remained unaltered, with only 14% of the Portuguese TTOs and 20% of the 
Spanish TTOs surveyed reporting variations over time. However, all these changes took 
place before the sample years selected for the econometric analysis (i.e., before 2007). 
Royalty sharing schedules were generally the outcome of a unilateral proposal from the 
universities’ governing councils, with researchers having almost no opportunity to 
influence the final decision. In most universities the primary goal pursued with the 
introduction of the royalty sharing schedule was to incentivize an increase in patenting, 
while only a few TTOs recognized the importance of maximizing licensing revenues. 
We provide more detailed information on the TTO survey in the following section.  
 
Inventors’ survey – The primary goal of the survey was to obtain direct feedback from 
university inventors on the importance of inventor royalty shares. A second goal of the 
survey was to relate the effectiveness of the royalty shares to measures of inventor 
quality.  
 
The target of the survey was all Portuguese and Spanish inventors that had applied for at 
least one patent between the years 2005 and 2009 (both inclusive) at the USPTO, the 
EPO or the respective national offices (the INPI in Portugal and the OEPM in Spain). In 
order to approximate this target population as closely as possible, we first retained all 
the patent applications (to the aforementioned offices) for which the assignee was a 
Portuguese (555 patent applications) or Spanish (5,148 patent applications) university. 
We then located the email addresses of the inventors of these patent applications 
through personalized Google searches. This yielded 534 email addresses in Portugal and 
3,033 in Spain (after dealing with multi-applicant inventors). We invited all the 
inventors for whom we had an email address to answer an online survey in January 
                                                            
19
 Red-OTRI (the network of Spanish TTOs) included 87 members in its 2010 directory. Most of these 
were ascribed to a university but some were universities without a TTO or TTOs ascribed to centers other 
than universities (such as scientific institutes and research centers). Most of the scientific research and 
virtually all the patents and license income are generated by 53 public universities. Therefore, we sent the 
survey to the TTOs of these universities that constitute our relevant population (47 of which filled it out). 
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(Portugal) and November (Spain) 2012. We obtained 212 complete responses for 
Portugal and 606 for Spain (meaning 40 and 20% response rates, respectively).  
 
We asked inventors to supply their individual characteristics (field of research, age, 
gender, type of contract with the university, rank and measures of quality) and for their 
opinion on several aspects relating to the effectiveness of royalty shares. Table 4 reports 
the descriptive statistics of the inventor characteristics. The results of the inventors’ 
perceptions of the royalty shares are discussed in the next section. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
 
4. Evidence 
Below we seek to provide empirical answers to the two research questions posed in 
Section 2. We study whether inventor royalty shares are effective at stimulating 
inventors’ efforts and improving university patenting and licensing outcomes, and then 
we analyze the role played by the moderators in attenuating the incentive effects 
expected from inventor royalty shares. In order to tackle these two research questions 
we draw on information from the university-level dataset and the surveys.  
 
Do inventor royalty shares have an incentive effect in Portugal and Spain? 
We first seek to answer this question econometrically using the objective university-
level dataset. University licensing revenue and the number of projects equals the 
scientists’ expected licensing income and the number of projects times the faculty size 
( F ) up to a multiplicative measurement error (
ue ): uesFrR ),,(   and 
uesFnN ),,(  . Taking logs and linearizing yield the following empirical equation 
 
itititit uxsy    (1) 
 
where i  indexes universities and t  years. The dependent variable ity  represents either 
itNln  (the log of the number of university patent applications in the corresponding 
national patent office) or itRln  (the log of the amount of university licensing income in 
Spain only – note  this information is not available for Portugal). The matrix of controls 
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itx  includes (the log of) faculty size, proxies for   such as the TTOs’ size and age, and 
proxies for   such as R&D per faculty or the pre-sample number of patent applications 
that will capture differences in inventors’ average quality across universities in 
performing commercially oriented research. The parameter of interest is  , which 
captures the effect of the inventor royalty share its  on the corresponding dependent 
variable. Positive values of   imply that inventor royalty shares are effective at 
stimulating inventors’ efforts. 
 
Lach and Schankerman (2008) highlight two sources of unobserved heterogeneity that 
are likely to be correlated with its . First, researchers with greater commercial orientation 
or more valuable inventions may be able to lobby their universities for more favorable 
royalty shares (a reverse causality problem).
 
This, however, does not seem to be the case 
at Portuguese and Spanish universities, according to the survey addressed to the 
TTOs.
20
 Second, higher inventor royalty shares may attract more innovation-oriented 
faculty (a sorting problem).
21
 Unlike in the US, the sorting channel is likely to play a 
minor role at Portuguese and Spanish universities where faculty mobility is relatively 
low. In any case, we rely on pre-sample information on patenting by universities to 
control for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
Table 5 shows equation (1) estimates based on the unbalanced panels of Portuguese and 
Spanish universities described in Table 1.
22
 Although most universities were observed 
over several years, we are unable to use within estimators because the royalty share 
displays little variation over time (only a few universities change royalty shares over 
time and none of these changes were made during the sample period). Thus, the 
incentive effect of the royalty share is identified from the cross-sectional variation in the 
                                                            
20 The TTO survey suggests that inventors play a marginal role in the fixing of royalty shares both at 
Portuguese and Spanish universities. The royalty share was a unilateral proposal from the Governing 
Council in 41 and 64% of Portuguese and Spanish universities, respectively, with no participation of the 
researchers. In about a third of the universities in both countries, the royalty share was discussed in the 
Research Commission, with researchers being given the opportunity to influence the final decision. Only 
in 32% of Portuguese and 2% of Spanish universities did the researchers play a more active role in the 
royalty share decision. 
21 In this case, the estimated  would be an upward biased estimate of the pure effort component of the 
royalty shares, but it would remain a consistent estimate of the overall incentive effect (including both the 
effort and sorting components). 
22 These panels only include universities for which all the relevant explanatory variables were available at 
some point in time (12 Portuguese and 39 Spanish universities). We experimented with a simpler 
specification with fewer explanatory variables (royalty shares, pre-sample patenting and time dummies) 
that allowed for broader panels, but the results remained unchanged.     
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data. We use clustered-robust standard errors to allow for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation within universities.  
 
For each country and dependent variable we begin with a parsimonious specification 
that only includes the royalty share, pre-sample information on patenting by universities 
to control for unobserved heterogeneity and time dummies (columns 1, 3 and 5). The 
coefficient associated with the inventor’s royalty share is insignificantly different from 
zero in all cases. Next we expand this specification with a series of additional 
explanatory variables (columns 2, 4 and 6). Again, the coefficient associated with the 
inventor’s royalty share is insignificantly different from zero in all cases, except column 
(4) where it is only significant at the 10% level. This set of results suggests that royalty 
shares play a negligible role in stimulating patenting and license income at the 
university level in Spain and Portugal. As for the other regressors, the pre-sample 
average number of patent applications is significant in most of the regressions. This 
implies that this variable controls, at least, in part, unobserved heterogeneity. The 
remaining explanatory variables are mainly insignificant. The amount of experience 
accumulated by the TTO seems to positively affect patenting in Portugal, while faculty 
size is positively correlated with patenting in Spain.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
 
Direct feedback from the inventors’ survey (reported in Table 6) concurs in the main 
with the econometric results. Inventors are strikingly unaware of the royalty shares in 
force: only 48% (Portugal) and 28% (Spain) of the respondents report knowing what the 
inventor royalty share is at their university. This result falls well short of the results 
found for the US where there seems to be full awareness of monetary incentives among 
faculty.
23
 The degree of awareness is particularly surprising if we consider our survey 
was sent out to patent applicants, a subsample of faculty who should apparently be 
interested in the monetary incentives for commercializing their inventions. Not only is 
the degree of awareness low, but the majority of respondents claiming to be aware of 
the royalty shares reported that the share had little or no impact on their decision to 
                                                            
23 More than 90% of the TTOs at US universities surveyed in Lach and Schankerman (2008) claim their 
faculty are aware of their monetary incentives. Importantly, here we obtain this response from the 
inventors themselves, rather than via the TTOs. This might explain, in part, the large difference in the 
respective degrees of awareness.  
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generate patentable inventions. Of these, only slightly more than 10% stated that the 
royalty share was highly influential in incentivizing their research efforts. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
 
Why are inventor royalty shares not effective? 
Why royalty sharing policies are ineffective in incentivizing inventors’ efforts is a 
legitimate question, because Portuguese and Spanish TTOs use royalty shares as part of 
their toolkit for improving technology transfer. Yet, as we have shown, they have little 
or no impact. As discussed in the analytical setting, several conditions have to be 
satisfied for royalty shares to be effective. First (and most obviously), royalty shares 
need to be sufficiently large (given the efficiency of the TTO and the inventors’ ability 
to generate applied research) for inventors to care about licensing revenues. Second, the 
TTOs have to be sufficiently good at commercializing inventions. Third, inventors must 
have a sufficiently high ability for conducting patentable applied research to produce 
licensable inventions. 
 
We have shown in Section 3 that inventor royalty shares are well above zero and, thus, 
cannot be said to eliminate the inventors’ opportunities to earn licensing revenues. We 
can also confirm that inventors believe the royalty shares to be sufficiently high. 
Therefore, if royalty sharing schedules are not blocking the licensing game, then at least 
one of the other two moderators must be. Below, we discuss the extent to which the 
other two moderators of inventors’ efforts can be held responsible for the 
ineffectiveness of the royalty shares. 
 
Ineffective inventor royalty share levels – One potential explanation for the absence 
of any impact could be that inventor royalty shares are poorly chosen. Thus, there might 
be a certain threshold below which inventor royalty shares are ineffective. Does such a 
threshold exist and are current inventor royalty shares set below this threshold?  
 
Table 7 reports the inventors’ opinions regarding the inventor royalty shares. Most of 
the respondents claiming to be aware of these shares believe them to be high enough to 
incentivize their effort. Most of the remaining inventors (those who are either unaware 
of the royalties or those that are aware of them but consider them to be too low) believe 
17
  
that there is a minimum royalty threshold above which it would be worthwhile to 
increase their effort. Surprisingly, these inventors believe the “effort” threshold to be, 
on average, below the actual average inventor royalty shares in force.
24
  
 
Taken together these results suggest that current royalty shares are sufficiently high to 
incentivize inventors’ efforts. This reinforces the perception that either the gatekeeper 
effect or the quality of the applied research undermines the commercial prospects of the 
inventions generated. In short, poor commercialization prospects prevent royalty shares 
from being a useful incentive device.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 7] 
 
Gatekeeper effect – As in most European countries, Spanish and Portuguese 
universities retain ownership of intellectual property rights, with the commercialization 
of inventions depending ultimately on the TTOs. This means that inventors’ licensing 
revenues are largely dependent on the ability of TTOs to find licensees and to negotiate 
agreements. As discussed in the analytical setting, if the TTO is ineffective in 
commercializing inventions, royalty shares will have a smaller incentive effect or no 
effect at all. Does the TTOs’ inability to successfully commercialize inventions account 
for the ineffectiveness of royalty shares? 
 
An efficient way of empirically testing for the gatekeeper effect in the US has involved 
exploiting the fact that private universities are more aggressive than their public 
counterparts in their licensing strategies.
25
 This strategy, however, cannot be 
implemented in Europe where the bulk of universities performing scientific research are 
public.
26
 As such, we have to rely on qualitative information derived from the surveys. 
We explicitly asked the TTOs to identify the outcomes they pursue via their royalty 
                                                            
24 This outcome is entirely driven by ‘unaware’ inventors who set the “effort” threshold 10 (in Portugal) 
and 20 (in Spain) percentage points lower than the threshold set by ‘aware’ (but discontent) inventors. 
25 This is the strategy adopted by Lach and Schankerman (2008), while Belenzon and Schankerman 
(2009) also report that private universities are more likely to adopt incentive pay. In contrast, public 
universities tend to care more about local development objectives and often prefer to offer licenses to 
local start-up companies (at the expense of foregone license income). 
26
 Belenzon and Schankerman (2009) find that TTOs adopting incentive pay have between 30-40 percent 
more income per license. This effect is robust to differences in university ownership. We sought to 
implement this strategy but, unfortunately, almost none of the universities in our sample adopt incentive 
pay. 
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sharing schemes. The results to this question (reported in Table 8) reveal that TTOs are 
relatively uninterested in maximizing licensing income – less than a third mentioned 
being interested in maximizing total licensing revenue (27% in Portugal and 31% in 
Spain) or TTO revenue (9% in Portugal and 5% in Spain). This lack of interest 
presumably reflects the poor commercialization prospects anticipated for university 
inventions. This perception was backed up by comments from several respondents to 
the inventors’ survey, who accounted for the ineffectiveness of their royalty shares in 
terms of the limited ability of the TTOs to commercialize inventions. The general 
feeling is perhaps best captured in the following words of one scientist: “who cares 
about getting 100% of nothing?”. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 8] 
 
Interestingly, most of the TTOs claim to use the royalty shares to incentivize university 
patenting and to improve its scientific production. These responses suggest that TTOs 
are unaware that royalty shares only incentivize enhanced research efforts if 
accompanied by good commercialization prospects. Indeed, the only way of boosting 
patenting and scientific production through royalty sharing is via a credible commitment 
to the maximization of licensing income.  
 
Overall, the feedback from the surveys is consistent with the econometric results 
reported in Table 5 where the proxies for the quality of the TTO at commercializing 
inventions (i.e., the size and age of the TTO) are generally found to be not significant 
(with only age having a positive effect on patenting in Portugal).  
 
Inventors’ ability to perform applied research – Inventors would certainly not 
respond to royalty incentives if their ability to perform applied research was such that 
their chances of producing licensable inventions were non-existent. We use the 
inventors’ survey to determine whether inventors capable of producing high quality 
research are better informed about royalty shares and more sensitive to the value of 
these shares. We construct two dependent variables based on the results reported in 
Table 6: a dummy variable with a value of one if inventors are aware of the royalty 
share and zero otherwise; and, a dummy variable with a value of one if inventors 
consider the royalty share to have a high or medium influence on their efforts to be 
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inventive and zero otherwise. We regress these two variables on three measures of 
inventor quality: whether the inventor has applied for patents from international offices 
(as opposed to only national offices), the number of sexenios
27
 earned by the scientists 
and whether the inventor holds the title of ‘professor’ or not. Only the last indicator of 
quality is available for Portugal. The results are reported in Table 9. In all cases we 
control for gender, age and a full set of university and field fixed effects.   
 
In columns (1) and (5) our proxy for quality in applied research is a dummy variable 
with a value of one if the inventor has applied for a patent from the USPTO or the EPO 
between 2005 and 2009 and zero if it has only applied for patents from the national 
office (our preferred proxy). Inventors with international patent applications have a 
significantly higher degree of awareness of royalty shares, but they do not seem to find 
them more important for incentivizing their research efforts. In the other columns we 
use a set of variables that proxy a more generic type of quality: a set of dummy 
variables representing the different number of sexenios earned by a scholar and a 
dummy variable with a value of one if the inventor holds the title of ‘professor’. Neither 
of these variables seems to explain different attitudes towards royalty shares. If 
anything, inventors with four sexenios seem to be slightly more aware of royalty shares 
than inventors with no sexenios (but only at the 10% significance level). Interestingly, 
there are significant gender differences in the degree of awareness of royalty shares. 
Finally, the results remain stable when all the variables are included simultaneously in 
the regression. 
 
The finding that inventors with international patent applications are substantially more 
aware of the royalties is of particular interest as it suggests that only high quality patents 
with a good chance of being licensed spur inventors’ curiosity for learning about royalty 
sharing. However, as Table 4 shows, the percentage of inventors with international 
patent applications in our sample is extremely low (below 10%), which indicates that 
most inventors are producing patents with little commercial value and, hence, the 
                                                            
27 Sexenios are a supplement to a researcher’s salary awarded following evaluation by a national agency 
(CNEAI, National Commission for the Evaluation of Research Activity). This evaluation gives 
substantial weight to publications in international journals listed in the ISI’s Journal Citation Reports. In 
the Spanish research system, sexenios are seen as evidence of scientific excellence and their use has had 
positive effects on Spain’s scientific production (see Jiménez-Contreras et al., 2003). 
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royalty share does not matter much to them. All in all, it appears that pecuniary 
incentives would matter more if patents were registered in international offices.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 9] 
 
5. Conclusions 
We have investigated whether inventor royalty shares from patented inventions serve as 
an effective pecuniary incentive in Portuguese and Spanish universities. Plain 
regressions on university level datasets indicate that royalty shares have no impact on 
patenting or licensing income. The same result is obtained when using a new inventors’ 
survey, with most respondents declaring a low degree of awareness of corresponding 
royalty shares and only a few claiming to be influenced by the inventor royalty share.  
 
We have relied on the responses of inventors and TTOs to the new data surveys to 
determine why inventor royalty shares are ineffective. These seem to indicate that the 
current values of the inventor royalty shares are appropriate. Indeed, most inventors 
claim that the royalty shares established by their university are sufficiently attractive to   
incentivise their research effort. Despite this, it would seem that inventors are 
uninfluenced by royalty sharing because of the poor commercial prospects of their 
inventions. Two reasons can be forwarded to account for these poor expectations.  
 
First, TTOs are not sufficiently focused on commercializing inventions (i.e., finding 
licensees and negotiating agreements). It should be stressed that in Portugal as in Spain 
research universities are overwhelmingly public with their TTOs lacking a clear 
commercial orientation. Indeed, in Portugal some TTOs (see Cartaxo and Godinho, 
2014) claim to be much more concerned with regional development and the boosting of 
local entrepreneurship through university spin-offs than in licensing revenue. In some 
cases, (non-exclusive) licenses are even offered to local firms without any sort of 
payment simply to maximize the chances of university-generated knowledge being 
diffused among local economic agents. A further potential explanation for their lack of 
interest in maximizing licensing income is that TTOs can rely on other sources of 
financing, including university funds, revenues from training and consulting services, 
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and overheads charged to researchers from European projects.
28
 Our surveys addressed 
to the TTOs reflect this lack of interest in licensing income. Surprisingly, royalty 
sharing schemes seek to maximize the number of patents and not the amount of 
licensing revenues, as one might expect. This suggests that TTOs fail to fully 
understand that royalty sharing can serve as an incentive by providing enhanced revenue 
opportunities for researchers. 
 
Second, inventors seem to be failing to produce licensable inventions; hence, their lack 
of response to royalty shares. Inventors applying for patents in international offices 
(arguably higher quality patents) seem to care more about royalty sharing. However, 
only a few university inventors in Portugal and Spain apply for patents in international 
offices. While the number of patents in Portugal and Spain has grown dramatically in 
recent years, the quality of these patents might not yet be good enough to generate 
licensing income. It appears that in both countries, universities are more interested in 
obtaining patents to enhance their reputation and then in exploiting this reputation 
premium to foster technology transfer through R&D partnerships with industry. A 
second possibility could be that patents are being used to strengthen technology transfer 
through the creation of spin-off firms. In neither of these cases would patenting be 
related to licensing.   
 
Clearly, a further explanation for the absence of any incentive effects attributable to 
royalty sharing could be that university scientists are disproportionately driven by 
traditional academic motivations (i.e., eponymy, prizes and publication). This argument 
has not been empirically tested in this paper (although it has been taken into account in 
the analytical model providing the predictions tested herein). Indeed, it should be 
stressed that in Portugal and Spain more importance has traditionally been attached to 
academic activities, such as publishing, for obtaining tenure and other career 
promotions than to patents or licensing. Thus, classic academic incentives can be said to 
impose a lower bound on the pay-off from commercially oriented research: scientists 
will only devote effort to producing commercially oriented inventions if the expected 
                                                            
28 We should add that most TTOs, particularly those in Portugal, but also in Spain, are small and still at a 
very early stage on the learning curve. However, over the last few years, the patenting policies of some 
TTOs have shifted from a “quantity” to a “quality” strategy. Indeed, a number of TTOs seem now to be 
more commercially aware of their activities and have attained a critical scale whereby they can 
successfully license their universities’ patents.  
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gains from so doing are greater than the gains from producing publications (i.e., the 
possibility of obtaining tenured positions, promotions and eventually wage increases). 
 
Our findings have a number of policy implications. We have shown that inventor 
royalty shares in Portugal and Spain are ineffective essentially because inventions offer 
poor commercial prospects. For royalty shares to be an effective tool, both TTOs and 
inventors need to acquire greater commercial orientation. For example, TTOs would 
have to commit themselves to pro-active commercialization practices, including 
searching for licensees and not just encouraging invention disclosure and undertaking 
the ensuing administrative tasks (by and large their current roles). Given that most 
Portuguese and Spanish firms are not technology based, the demand for licenses is 
primarily from abroad, which means a successful licensing strategy would require the 
specific targeting of international licensees. Additionally, for inventor royalty shares to 
be an effective incentive, scientists will have to become more commercially oriented. In 
other words, scientists need to be able to produce inventions that can be economically 
exploited through patenting and licensing. 
 
However, it is not our wish to overstate the policy implications as it might simply not be 
optimal from a welfare viewpoint to maximize licensing income. Indeed, universities in 
Spain and Portugal are public and, as such, are likely to prioritize other goals. For 
instance, they might prefer to maximize regional development, for which there are 
forms of technology transfer, such as spin-off creation and R&D cooperation 
agreements, that are likely to better serve this purpose. Spin-offs, for example, tend to 
locate in the same region as the university from which they emerge thereby 
guaranteeing regional development (Zhang, 2009; Zucker et al., 1998). Licensing, on 
the other hand, only spurs regional development if inventions are licensed to local 
licensees, which might be at odds with maximizing licensing income.
29
 Moreover, 
universities might prefer their researchers to commit to academic research (which is 
believed to be a greater source of spillovers than commercially oriented research). 
 
                                                            
29 Belenzon and Schankerman (2009) find that public universities with strong local development 
objectives see their licensing income reduced because they prefer to license to local firms (even if it is at a 
discount). 
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The apparent lack of interest shown by Portuguese and Spanish universities in licensing 
income might therefore be totally legitimate. However, TTOs in both countries do use 
royalty sharing schemes to improve technology transfer. It is perhaps this coexistence of 
royalty sharing policies and the lack of interest in licensing income that is somewhat 
puzzling, because royalty sharing can only be effective when combined with a credible 
commitment to commercialization.  
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Figure 1. Distribution of inventor royalty shares in Portugal and Spain  
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Table 1. Summary of results in the related literature 
Paper Data 
Dependent 
variable 
Explanatory 
variable of 
interest 
Method-
ology Effect 
Friedman and 
Silberman 
(2003) 
U.S.  AUTM 
Annual 
Licensing Survey 
1997-1999; 
“Research 
Doctorate 
Programs in the 
United States: 
Continuity and 
Change,”  
National Research 
Council, 1995 
Number of 
licenses 
and 
licensing 
income 
Royalty 
share 
Regression 
No effect on number 
of licenses, positive on 
licensing income 
Markman et al. 
(2004) 
U.S. AUTM 
Licensing Surveys 
(1999, 2000); 
phone interviews 
with 128 UTTO 
directors; web-
based searches of 
each UTTO’s 
institution; the 
United States 
Patent and 
Trademark Office 
Number of 
equity 
licenses 
Royalty 
share 
Regression Negative 
Link and 
Siegel (2005) 
U.S. AUTM 
Survey, 113 
academic 
institutions, 1991-
1998; field 
interviews at five 
research 
universities in two 
regions of the USA 
Number of 
licenses 
and 
licensing 
income 
Royalty 
share 
SFE 
estimation 
Positive 
Lach and 
Schankerman 
(2008) 
U.S. AUTM 
Annual 
Licensing Survey 
1997-1999 
(unbalanced panel 
of 102 universities) 
Licensing 
income 
Royalty 
share 
Regression Positive 
Belenzon and 
Schankerman 
(2009) 
U.S. 2003 survey 
102 TLOs in 
public and private 
universities; 
AUTM annual 
surveys 1995-
2001; patent data 
from U.S. Patent 
and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) 
Income per 
license 
Performance 
pay in TTO 
Regression Positive 
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Sauermann et 
al. (2010) 
U.S. Survey of 
Doctorate 
Recipients (NSF, 
2001, 2003); 
AUTM surveys; 
measures of PhD 
program quality 
National Research 
Council (1995) 
Patenting 
Royalty 
share and 
salary 
Regression 
Royalty shares have 
no effect. Salary has a 
positive effect on 
Physical Sciences but 
not on Life Sciences 
and Engineering. 
Baldini et al. 
(2007) 
Italy survey of 208 
Italian faculty 
inventors of 
university-owned 
1990-2002 patents 
Patenting 
Personal 
earnings 
Survey 
(inventors) 
Very weak  
Baldini (2010) 
Italy dataset of 
Italian universities’ 
patents 1988-2002 
Patents 
filed 
Royalty 
share 
Regression Positive 
Caldera and 
Debande 
(2010) 
Spain annual 
2001-2005 surveys 
of the Spanish 
TTO network 
(RedOTRI) 
Number of 
licenses 
and 
licensing 
income  
Royalty 
share 
Regression 
Positive effect on 
licensing income but 
not on the number of 
licenses 
Göktepe and 
Mahagaonkar 
(2010) 
Germany 2007 
Max Planck 
Society survey on 
the commercial 
activities of 2,500 
scientists affiliated 
to 67 institutes 
Patenting 
Monetary 
expectations 
Regression No 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 Portugal  Spain 
 Mean S.D. Min Max  Mean S.D. Min Max 
          
 License revenue regression 
 (N=0)  (N=39, N*T=155) 
          
License income (in thousands of Euros)      66.32 99.59 0 600 
Royalty share      53.87 10.71 33 90 
Pre-sample patent applications      8.20 8.06 1 36 
Size of TTO      17.31 15.71 3 83 
Age of TTO in 2007      15.95 3.52 4 20 
Faculty size      2,812 4,565 546 40,879 
R&D (in thousands of Euros)      33,243 25,676 3,825 119,000 
          
 Patent application regression 
 (N=15, N*T=56)  (N=39, N*T=188) 
          
Patent applications 9.52 10.06 0 54  11.95 11.47 0 72 
Royalty share 54.82 8.89 30 80  53.67 11.43 33 90 
Pre-sample patent applications 9.24 13.22 0 49  7.74 7.66 1 36 
Size of TTO 4.47 2.80 1 9  16.35 14.96 3 83 
Age of TTO in 2007 5.20 4.77 0 17  15.74 3.65 4 20 
Faculty size 961 417 424 1924  2,617 4,192 546 40,879 
R&D (in thousands of Euros) na na na na  31,225 24,627 2,575 119,000 
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Table 3. Variable definitions and sources   
Variable Definition Source Portugal Source Spain 
Licensing income (in 
thousands of Euros) 
Total licensing income of the university in thousands of 
Euros. It includes income not only from patents but also 
from other sources such as software, databases or know-
how. Licensing income from patents is only observed from 
2009 onwards and accounted, on average, for 37, 63 and 
58% of total licensing income in the years 2009, 2010 and 
2011 respectively. 
na Red OTRI Surveys1 
Patent applications Number of patent applications in the national offices Portuguese patent office Spanish patent and 
trademark office 
Inventor royalty share Share of license revenues that goes to the inventor as 
established in the royalty sharing scheme of the university 
Survey to TTOs Survey to TTOs and 
tables in González-
Albo-Manglano and 
Zulueta-García (2007)2 
Pre-sample patent 
applications 
Average number of patent applications in the national 
office in the years 2005 and 2006 
Portuguese patent office Spanish patent and 
trademark office 
Size of TTO Number of  workers in the TTO that have a technical 
profile 
2008 Survey to TTOs Red OTRI Surveys1 
Age of TTO in 2007 Age of the TTO in 2007  2008 Survey to TTOs Red OTRI Surveys1  
Faculty size Number of researchers in the university (in Spain this 
corresponds to the PDI categories described in the 
LOMLOU) 
http://w3.dgeec.mec.pt/rebides/20XX/ Red OTRI Surveys1 
R&D (in thousands of 
Euros) 
Total amount of research support committed to the 
university through programs for financing public research 
na Red OTRI Surveys1 
Notes: 1. http://www.crue.org/Publicaciones/Paginas/Informe-RedOTRI.aspx?Mobile=0; 2. The tables with the royalty shares can be found in 
http://www.scielo.br/pdf/ci/v36n1/a05v36n1.pdf. 
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Table 4. Inventors’ characteristics (from the inventors’ survey) 
  Portugal  Spain 
  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Age 46.89 8.52  46.39 9.27 
Male 0.71   0.77  
Permanent contract 0.54   0.82  
Position      
 PhD student 0.00   0.04  
 Postdoc 0.02   0.08  
 Assistant professor  0.43   0.09  
 Associate professor 0.37   0.51  
 Professor 0.17   0.29  
Number of “sexenios”a na   2.15 1.69 
International patent applicationsa na   0.09  
Field      
 Architecture 0.01   0.02  
 Biology
a na   0.06  
 Chemistry 0.05   0.14  
 Engineering 0.47   0.37  
 Medicine 0.03   0.05  
 Nutrition
b 0.27   na  
 Pharmacy
b 0.05   0.04  
 Physics
a na   0.06  
 Technology and Management 0.04   na  
 Telecomunications na   0.06  
 Other 0.19   0.17  
       
Notes: The statistics for Portugal are based on the 212 responses for which we have full 
information. The statistics for Spain are based on the 606 responses for which we have full 
information except for the variable “International patent applications” for which we only have 
information for 573 researchers. The variable “International patent applications” is a dummy 
variable with value one if the inventor has international patent applications (in the USPTO and 
EPO offices) and zero otherwise. This was not obtained directly from the survey but from 
matching the survey with the original database on patents retrieved from the patent offices. All 
the variables are dummy variables except for “Age” and “Number of sexenios” and we only 
report standard deviations for these last two variables. a) The number of “Sexenios” is a 
recognition awarded to Spanish scholars that does not exist in Portugal (see footnote 23 for fuller 
explanation), the number of international patent applications by scientist is available for Spain 
but not for Portugal, the fields “Biology” and “Physics” are specific to the Spanish survey. b) 
The fields “Nutrition” and “Technology and Management” are specific to the Portuguese survey. 
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Table 5. License revenue, patent applications and inventor royalty shares 
 Portugal  Spain 
 Patent applications  Patent applications  License revenue 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Royalty share 0.00 -0.01  0.01 0.01*  0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.00)  (0.02) (0.02) 
log(Pre-sample patent applications) 0.53*** 0.28  0.78*** 0.57***  0.88*** 0.29 
 (0.14) (0.19)  (0.07) (0.10)  (0.25) (0.35) 
log(TTO/Faculty)  -0.31   0.11   0.17 
  (0.20)   (0.08)   (0.35) 
Age TTO  0.22**   0.04   -0.04 
  (0.09)   (0.06)   (0.27) 
Age TTO squared  -0.01*   -0.00   0.00 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01) 
log(Faculty)  -0.23   0.42**   0.63 
  (0.21)   (0.16)   (0.41) 
log(R&D/Faculty)     0.24*   0.51 
     (0.14)   (0.40) 
Constant 0.72 0.79  0.12 -6.24**  1.15 -10.52 
 (1.07) (1.53)  (0.28) (3.04)  (0.92) (9.24) 
         
Observations 56 56  188 188  155 155 
Universities 15 15  39 39  39 39 
R-squared 0.34 0.43  0.66 0.71  0.24 0.37 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Clustered robust 
standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the log of one plus the number of patent 
applications and total license revenue. All the regressions include a full set of time dummies. The sample 
used considers the period 2007-2011 (both years inclusive). 
 
 
Table 6. Awareness and importance of inventor royalty share (from the inventors’ survey) 
     
  Portugal  Spain 
1) Do you know what the inventor royalty share is in your university? 
Yes (%) 48  28 
No (%) 52  72 
# Respondents 212  606 
     
2) What is the influence of the inventor royalty share on your decision to generate patentable 
inventions? 
High (%) 14  11 
Medium (%) 28  23 
Low (%) 27  34 
None (%) 30  33 
# Respondents 102  168 
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Table 7. Optimal royalty shares (from the inventors’ survey) 
     
  Portugal  Spain 
1) Is the inventor royalty share high enough to incentivize efforts aimed at 
producing patentable inventions? (Addressed to respondents who are aware of the 
royalty share) 
Yes (%) 62  63 
No (%) 38  37 
# Respondents 102  168 
     
2) Is there a minimum threshold above which you would find it worthwhile to 
devote efforts to producing patentable inventions? (Addressed to researchers who 
either do not participate in question 1 or answer ‘no’ to question 1) 
Yes (%) 58  62 
No (%) 42  38 
# Respondents 149  500 
     
3) What is this threshold? (Addressed to researchers who either do not participate 
in question 1 or answer ‘no’ to question 1) 
     
 3.1) All researchers 
 Mean 45.6  29.9 
 S.D.  20.7  19.8 
 # Respondents 86  249 
     
 3.2) Researchers who know the current royalty shares 
 Mean 53.8  47.2 
 S.D. 17.3  23.1 
 # Respondents 19  35 
     
 3.3) Researchers who do not know the current royalty shares 
 Mean 43.3  27.1 
 S.D.  21.1  17.8 
 # Respondents 67  214 
     
 Difference 3.2)-3.3) 
 Mean 10.6  20.3 
 S.D.  5.3  3.4 
 p-value 0.025  0.000 
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Table 8. Goals pursued with the established royalty share (from the TTO survey) 
    
 Portugal  Spain 
a. Incentivize an increase in university patenting (%) 50  93 
b. Maximize total income from patents (%) 27  31 
c. Maximize university (TTO) revenues (%) 9  5 
d. Favor the development of “spin-off” (%) 23  10 
e. Improve the scientific production of the university (%) 36  40 
f. Attract high quality researchers (%) 9  2 
    
Total number of respondents 22  45 
Notes: the responses are not mutually exclusive. Most TTOs generally selected one or two 
goals (with a few even identifying three).  
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Table 9. Inventors’ quality and effectiveness of the royalty shares. Evidence for Spain (from the inventors’ survey) 
         
 Awareness High or medium importance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
 Spain 
         
USPTO - EPO 0.63***   0.64*** -0.08   -0.00 
 (0.21)   (0.21) (0.45)   (0.45) 
1 sexenio  0.16  0.17  0.13  0.13 
  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.77)  (0.77) 
2 sexenios  0.21  0.23  -0.40  -0.43 
  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.63)  (0.61) 
3 sexenios  0.35  0.39  0.08  0.03 
  (0.25)  (0.24)  (0.48)  (0.48) 
4 sexenios  0.58*  0.60*  -0.58  -0.80 
  (0.31)  (0.32)  (0.83)  (0.74) 
5 sexenios  0.42  0.38  -0.21  -0.40 
  (0.37)  (0.37)  (0.82)  (0.85) 
6 sexenios  0.31  0.43  -0.62  -0.85 
  (0.46)  (0.47)  (1.15)  (1.11) 
Professor   0.13 -0.03   0.04 0.30 
   (0.20) (0.23)   (0.42) (0.43) 
Male 0.60*** 0.63*** 0.60*** 0.63*** 0.43 0.50 0.44 0.39 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.67) (0.74) (0.73) (0.70) 
Age 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Constant -2.32*** -2.01** -2.18*** -2.07** -4.55*** -5.17*** -4.59*** -5.20*** 
 (0.70) (0.91) (0.78) (0.91) (0.94) (1.84) (1.26) (1.60) 
         
Observations 536 534 536 534 119 118 119 118 
         
         
 Portugal 
         
Professor   0.13    -0.54  
   (0.67)    (0.68)  
Male   0.52*    0.63  
   (0.29)    (0.77)  
Age   0.01    0.04  
   (0.02)    (0.03)  
Constant   0.58    -3.43**  
   (0.82)    (1.38)  
         
Observations   181    84  
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Clustered (at the university 
level) robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variables are a dummy variable with value one if the 
inventor is aware of the inventor royalty share at her university (columns 1-4) and a dummy variable if the inventor 
claims that the inventor royalty share was of ‘high’ importance in stimulating her effort (columns 5-8). All the 
regressions include a full set of university and field dummies. In the regressions we use all the available 
observations from the surveys for which all the variables needed in the regressions have non-missing values. 
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